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OVERBOOKING AND DENIED BOARDING: LEGAL
RESPONSE IN THE LAST DECADE
JOYCE MCLAUGHLIN

INTRODUCTION

COMMERCIAL AIR TRAVEL performs an increasingly
important function in our society as passengers rely
extensively on airlines for business and leisure activities.
Passengers want the flexibility to change travel plans at
will, without paying for the reservations they cancel or
change. Although the demand for their services is great,
the airlines face stiff competition among themselves for
passengers, particularly since deregulation. Airlines want
to book flights to capacity to improve the profitability of
their operations. The tension between the passengers'
need for reliable but flexible travel arrangements and the
airlines' need to fly with capacity loads has caused the familiar practice of "bumping." Bumping occurs when
boarding is denied due to overbooking.' The bumped
passenger usually accepts compensation from the airline,
but may instead seek redress in the courts for his frustration and inconvenience. 2 This paper reviews the response
of the legal system to the bumping problem and gives the
current practitioner a grasp of the traditional remedies,
current regulations and viable causes of action since del See generally Tice, Overbooking of Airline Reservations in View of Nader v. Allegheny
Airlines, Inc: The Opening of Pandora's Box, 43J. AIR L. & CoM. 1, 2 (1977).
,, See 14 C.F.R. § 250.9(b) (1988). This section specifically provides under
"Passenger's Options" that the bumped passenger may decline payment of compensation and "seek to recover damages in a court of law or in some other manner." Id.
1135
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regulation. Section I gives a general overview of the
problem. Section II discusses legal responses through
1976 with particular attention to discrimination as a cause
of action.4 Section III presents a brief summary of the
landmark case Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., which established airline liability for fraudulent misrepresentation of
its overbooking and bumping practices.- Section IV examines legal responses since Nader through four subsections, grouped by cause of action, including
misrepresentation, discrimination, breach of contract, and
emotional distress.6 A fifth subsection mentions bumping
cases caused by circumstances not related to overbooking
which must be considered before proceeding with an action. 7 Section V draws conclusions about the probable
continued success of legal prosecution for bumping.8
I.

OVERBOOKING OVERVIEW

Airlines have practiced overbooking since the postWorld War II boom in commercial air travel, 9 with the inevitable result that some passengers are denied seats.
The root of the overbooking problem is that a certain
number of passengers do not make the flight and do not
cancel their reservations in time for them to be resold.' 0
:1See infra notes 9-24 and accompanying text for the general overview of the
bumping problem.
See infra notes 25-66 and accompanying text for discussion of the legal responses to bumping.
See infra notes 67-112 and accompanying text for the summary of Nader v.
Allegheny Airlines, Inc.
, See infra notes 113-274 and accompanying text. A review of current regulations in 14 C.F.R. § 250 (1988) relating to oversales accompanies notes 121
through 136. Misrepresentation claims are discussed in text accompanying notes
137 through 157. Discrimination claims are discussed in text accompanying notes
158 through 210. Breach of contract claims are discussed in text accompanying
notes 211 through 242.
7 See infra notes 275-293 and accompanying text.
These causes of action are
generally beyond the scope of this paper but may lead to further research.
8 See infra notes 294-303 and accompanying text, which draw conclusions
about the bumping problem.
See generally Ruppenthal, Bumping the Passenger, 190 NATION 551 (1960).
See Tice, supra note 1, at 1-12 for a thorough discussion of the practice of
overbooking from the airlines' point of view. Included are airline practices and
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However, these customers want the flexibility to change
their plans without financial penalty. Other factors which
contribute to overbooking are travel agency error, multiple bookings, and failure to cancel downline reservations."' Airlines respond to an anticipated number of
"no-shows" by booking more reservations than the flight
has seats. 12 Although these overbookings are based on
statistical predictions (the "booking curve"),' 3 for any
given flight more persons may arrive with confirmed reservations than there are seats on the airplane. Some passengers are then "bumped" or denied permission to
board.
The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), which regulated
the airlines until abolished by deregulation,' 4 allowed the
airlines to overbook by neither expressly prohibiting nor
regulating overbooking.' 5 Allowing overbooking helped
airlines to mitigate losses caused by "no-shows.'

1

6

The

CAB tried to protect the passenger by requiring the airprocedures under the Civil Aeronautics Board, which were abolished in the process of deregulation. See 14 C.F.R. § 250 editorial note (1988) (List of Sections
Affected).
11Heister, Discriminatory Bumping, 40J. AIR L. & COM. 533, 534 n.5 (1974). For
example travel agents may report airline reservations confirmed when in fact they
are not, leading to uncertainty by the airline as to whether the flight is
overbooked. Id. at 534 n.5. Passengers may attempt to avoid bumping by making
reservations on several consecutive flights, which leads the airlines to compensate
by overbooking. Id. at 534. Finally, airlines may fail to cancel downline reservations, those reservations which form separate legs of a multiflight trip, after the
initial reservation is missed. Id. at 534 n.5. Airlines overbook to compensate for
all these errors in an effort to avoid vacant seats on flights. See also Tice, supra note
1, at 5, for additional discussion of these factors.
"I Heister, supra note 11, at 534; see also Tice, supra note 1, at 1, 3 n.7.
'. Tice, supra note 1, at 3. The booking curve, determined for each flight, is a
statistical correlation between the number of reservations and the number of passengers who actually show up for a flight, based on past experience with that
flight. Id.
, 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(2)(B) (1982). The CAB went out of existence effective
January 1, 1985. For a concise summary of the CAB's history, functions, and statutory basis, see OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, NATIONAL ARCHIVES &
RECORDS SERVICE, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,

MENT MANUAL 1984-85, at 470 (1984).
' Tice, supra note 1, at 8-9.
Id. at 8.

UNITED STATES GOVERN-

1138 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[54

lines to file tariffs' 7 stating their boarding priority rules.' 8
These rules set forth the procedures for determining
which passengers were bumped and required the airline
to compensate the bumped passengers with money, tickets for another flight, or alternative travel arrangements, 9
referred to as "denied boarding compensation." The acceptance of denied boarding compensation constituted
liquidated damages, preventing the passenger from pursuing other legal remedies.20 The CAB regulated only the
manner of bumping and compensation, but allowed
overbooking to continue unabated. Deregulation transferred the tariffs incorporating the boarding priority rules
to the Office of the Secretary, Department of Transportation, effective January 1, 1985.21 Thus, deregulation perpetuated the CAB's approach to overbooking.
Statistics reflect that since deregulation the problem
may have become worse rather than better.22 The rate of
bumpings in 1987 was 20.46 per 10,000 passengers,23
compared with 6.0 per 10,000 in 1975 and 10.0 per
10,000 in 1968.24 Statistical summaries and booking
17 Tariffs are written rules and regulations promulgated by the carrier which
govern rights and liabilities of airlines and passengers. Hitchcock, Today and Tomorrow: The Rights and Remedies of Airline Passengers, TRIAL, Aug. 1981, at 34. Tariffs
are very long documents, 25,000 to 50,000 pages, which are incorporated by reference into the conditions of contract attached to airline tickets. Id.
,, Tice, supra note 1, at 9 n.40.
Id. at 9.
211 Id. at 10 n.45 (citing 14 C.F.R. § 250.5 (1975)).
'-1 14 C.F.R. § 250 editorial note (1988) (List of Sections Affected).
22 Compare statistics in Tice, supra note 1, at 4 with those in Overbookings RiseContrary to Predictions, Wall St.J., Mar. 7, 1988, at 37, col. 2. Tice reported statistics from Aviation Daily for years 1968 through 1975 showing numbers of persons
denied boarding per 10,000 enplanements. Tice, supra note 1, at 4 n.12. The
Wall Street Journal gave statistics by airline for 1987.
2.1 Overbookings Rise-Contrary to Predictions, supra note 22, at 37, col. 2. Combined voluntary/involuntary bumping statistics from the Department of Transportation reflected that overbookings were at 19.97 per 10,000 enplanements in
1986 and 20.46 in 1987. Id. A breakdown by airline shows large variation in the
bumping problem among carriers in 1987: United Airlines' rate was 29.3; Eastern,
28.6; Continental, 25.9; Piedmont, 25.7; U.S. Air, 22.4; Northwest, 20.6; TWA,
19.1; American, 18.8; Pan Am, 17.9; and Delta, 6.1 (all figures are per 10,000
passengers). Id.
2, Tice, supra note 1, at 4. The bumping rate industry-wide per 10,000 passen-
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curve explanations do little to placate the disgruntled passenger whose schedule is disrupted and whose arrangements are forcibly altered without warning. Although in
most instances passengers accept either a later flight or
compensation in return for being bumped, some passengers take the airline to court for monetary or punitive
motives.
II.

EARLY LEGAL RESPONSES

In response to a suit brought by a bumped passenger,
the courts applied traditional legal principles and statutory provisions to determine whether the bumped passenger was entitled to relief, and, if so, how to correctly
measure damages. The common law provided contract
and tort theories of recovery, but federal antidiscrimination statutes provided the initial source for one of the
most successful causes of action. Fitzgeraldv. Pan American
World Airways 25 was the landmark case establishing a
cause of action for airline discrimination under the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938 (CAA). 26 Pan American denied
singer Ella Fitzgerald seating in the first-class section on a
flight in Hawaii. 27 Fitzgerald, her secretary and her accompanist originally boarded the plane in San Francisco
in first-class seats, with a final destination of Sydney, Ausgers was 10.0 in 1968, 9.5 in 1969, 5.7 in 1970, 5.3 in 1971, 5.4 in 1972, 4.6 in
1973, 5.8 in 1974, and 6.0 in 1975. Id.
25 229 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1956).
Fitzgerald was based on the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 § 404(b):
No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall make, give, or cause any
undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular
person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air transportation
any respect whatsoever or subject any particular person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air transportation to any unjust discrimination or undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in
any respect whatsoever.
Fitzgerald, 229 F.2d at 500. This anti-discrimination provision was succeeded by
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 404(b) codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b). Wills
v. Trans World Airlines, 200 F. Supp. 360, 363 (S.D. Cal. 1961). The 1958 provision retained the wording of the 1938 provision. See Smith v. Piedmont Aviation,
Inc., 567 F.2d 290, 291 n.1 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting exact language of 1958
provision).
27 Fitzgerald, 229 F.2d at 500.
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tralia.28 On a stopover in Hawaii, they temporarily left the
plane and the airline agent refused to let them resume
their first-class seats. 29 Fitzgerald alleged the airline's refusal to allow them to reboard was willful, malicious, and
motivated by racial prejudice, subjecting them to unjust
discrimination. 0 The CAA prohibited unjust discrimination by providing penalties enforceable by the government. Under the CAA, the court implied a private right of
action by the wronged individual with a remedy of monetary damages." Although Fitzgerald was technically a case
of bumping based on racial discrimination, the decision
established important precedent which later courts used
in the overbooking situation. 2
The cause of action found in Fitzgerald did not remain
restricted to racial discrimination. Other courts soon expanded the cause of action to include any unjust discrimination in seating passengers.3 3 In Wills v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc. 34 a California court concluded that an airline's failure to follow its customary seating procedures
resulted in unjust discrimination.
The airline agent
bumped Wills from his confirmed seat in tourist class in
favor of a passenger with a first-class reservation, in violation of the airline's own boarding priority rules.3 6 Follow" Id.
29

Id.

Id.
Id. at 501. The Fitzgerald court cited language in Reitmeister v. Reitmeister,
162 F.2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1947) which construed a criminal statute, "enacted for
the protection of a specified class, as creating a civil right in members of the class,
although the only express sanctions are criminal." Fitzgerald, 229 F.2d at 501. For
a more thorough discussion of the Fitzgeraldcase and the creation of a civil remedy
from a criminal statute, see Heister, supra note 11, at 535.
:"- Heister, supra note 11, at 535.
-:1See generally the discussion of unjust discrimination in Heister, supra note 11.
Heister's article provides a detailed analysis of the historical development of the
unjust discrimination cause of action through 1974. This paper gives only a summary to avoid needless duplication of Heister's efforts.
:.. 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
I at 365.
Id.
:11Id. The court said the airline "arbitrarily and capriciously" gave the plaintiff's tourist seat "to a first-class passenger who, even under the airline's established procedure in event of oversales, was not entitled to it. By disregarding
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ing the reasoning of the Fitzgerald decision, the court held
that a civil remedy based on the CAA's discrimination
provision could be read into the statute by implication. 7
Even more significantly, the court awarded punitive damages against the airline.3 8 The court found that the deliberate practice of overbooking constituted willful or
wanton conduct necessary for such an award, and allowed
a punitive recovery of $5,000.31 In addition, the Wills
court acknowledged that a cause of action existed for
breach of contract.40 Since contract damages were limited
to ticket price with no exemplary damages allowed, the
discrimination charge provided a better recovery. 4 ' Thus,
Fitzgerald and Wills established a remedy for the bumped
passenger who could prove some discriminatory action by
the airline.42 The court also extended the possibility of
43
punitive damages for the overbooking practice itself.
The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) promulgated regulations that implied acceptance of overbooking practices
by specifying procedures for the airlines to follow when
they bumped a passenger.4 4 The CAB required airlines to
provide compensation for bumped passengers who complied with the airline ticketing, check-in, and reconfirmaplaintiff's priority, the defendant airline unjustly and unreasonably discriminated
against him, and thus violated the act." Id.
:7 Id. at 363-64, 367.
- Id. at 367-68; Heister, supra note 11, at 536.
...
Wills, 200 F. Supp. at 367-68. The court found evidence that there "had been
substantial overselling of reservations for defendant's domestic flights" which indicated that "defendant wantonly precipitated the very circumstances which necessitated discriminatory removal of excess confirmed passengers from its
flights." Id.
- Id. at 365. The court recognized that an alternative to the discrimination
claim was an action in state courts for breach of contract, under which the passenger would "rarely be able to prove actual damage commensurate with the wrong,
nor as a rule would be entitled to exemplary damages." Id.
41 Id.
42 See id.; Fitzgerald, 229 F.2d at 502.
,..
Wills, 200 F.Supp. at 367-68. Both Fitzgerald and Wills were based on the
CAA, which Congress replaced with the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. The 1958
Act retained the antidiscrimination provision of the CAA in section 404(b). See
supra note 26 for the text of the antidiscrimination provisions of both acts.
44 14 C.F.R. § 250 (1974); see Mortimer v. Delta Air Lines, 302 F. Supp. 276,
280 (N.D. Ill.
1969) (quoting the 1974 regulations).
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tion procedures. 45 Alternatively, the airline could provide
comparable alternate travel arrangements .46 Either compensation or alternative travel arrangements, if accepted,
would constitute liquidated damages.47 Mortimer v. Delta
Air Lines addressed the effect of these regulations on the
established discrimination and contractual causes of action and possible punitive damage recovery. 48 The Mortimer court held that the compensation required by the CAB
did not provide the exclusive remedy available to a
bumped passenger. 49 The passenger could choose either
to accept the compensation or to decline it and pursue
alternative legal remedies. 50 Any bumped passenger was
entitled to the denied boarding compensation whether
discrimination was involved or not. 5 ' If accepted, the
compensation constituted liquidated damages and provided the only remedy. 52 However, if the passenger was
45

14 C.F.R. § 250.4 (1974) required that "every carrier shall file tariffs provid-

ing compensation to a passenger holding confirmed reserved space who presents
himself for carriage at the appropriate time and place, having complied fully with
the carrier's requirements as to ticketing, check-in, and reconfirmation procedures, and being acceptable for transportation under the carrier's tariff ...."
Heister, supra note 11, at 538 n.27. Although the 1988 provisions differ in language, see infra notes 121-136 and accompanying text, the principle is the same.
14 C.F.R. § 250.6(b) (1974). This section stated,
A passenger shall not be eligible for denied boarding compensation
if:

. .

. (b) The carrier arranges for alternate means of transportation,

which, at the time such arrangement is made, is planned to arrive at
the passenger's next point of stopover earlier than, or not later than
two hours after, the time the flight, for which confirmed reserved
space is held, is planned to arrive ....
.Mfortimer, 302 F. Supp. at 281 n. 1.
17 14 C.F.R. § 250.7 (1974).
This regulation states that "the carrier will tender,
on the day and place the denied boarding occurs, compensation ...which, if
accepted by the passenger, shall constitute liquidated damages for all damages
incurred by the passenger as a result of the carrier's failure to provide the passenger with confirmed reserved space." Heister, supra note 11, at 538-39; see also
Mortimer, 302 F. Supp. at 282.
., 302 F. Supp. at 279, 282.
Id. at 280-81.
Id. at 281.
Id. The court clarified that if a flight is "inadvertently oversold the passenger
with the least priority, who is barred from the flight, is entitled to denied boarding
compensation ...even though no discriminatory or unfair treatment has been
practiced against him." Id.
52

Id. at 282.
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subjected to unjust discrimination and declined the compensation, he preserved his cause of action under the antidiscrimination provision of section 404(b) of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 and could still obtain punitive
damages. 53
Later refinements in procedure and proof, however,
tended to restrict recovery. The court in Stough v. North
Central Airlines54 held the airline was not liable even
though it seated two passengers who bought tickets later
than the bumped plaintiffs.5 5 The airline showed that its
established policy was to bump passengers who were last
to check in and that it adhered to that policy. 56 Thus, an
airline could establish its own rules for priority in boarding as long as the rules reflected no unjust discrimination
in themselves. Then, if the airline applied its rules consistently, no unjust discrimination resulted.5 7
Another court addressed burden of proof problems in a
discrimination case. The court in Archibald v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc. 58 concluded that a passenger could establish a prima facie case of unjust discrimination under
section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 59 by
showing that he had a confirmed reservation and that the
airline seated another passenger in preference to him.60
In making this prima facie case, the passenger did not
need to initially establish that the airline violated its
:' Id. The court noted that the need for punitive damages to deter similar future acts was of "little significance in justifying their award" since an administrative agency could ensure that end. Id. However, punitive awards might be
available where "necessary to provide a meaningful remedy for serious disregard
for civil rights." Id.
54 55 Ill. App. 2d 338, 204 N.E.2d 792 (1965).
.1 Id. at 338, 204 N.E.2d at 797.
m Id. at 338, 204 N.E.2d at 796.
57 Id. at 338, 204 N.E.2d at 797. "[T]he procedures which defendant followed,
when uniformly applied to all passengers, is [sic] not illustrative of discriminatory
conduct condemned by the Act." Id. at 338, 204 N.E.2d at 797.
460 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1972).
49 U.S.C. § 1374(b), repealed by Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-504,
§ 1551(a)(2)(B), 92 Stat. 1905 (1982) (effective Jan. 1, 1983); see supra note 26
quoting language of antidiscrimination provision.
,,, Archibald, 460 F.2d at 17.
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boarding policy. 6' Upon this showing, the burden of
proof shifted to the airline to establish its boarding rules
62
and its compliance with them in that particular case. If
the airline established compliance, there was not discrimination under the statute.
Finally, the court in Kaplan v. Lufthansa Airlines63 limited
the award of punitive damages for overbooking. The airline overbooked and then did not adhere to its own
boarding priority rules, which prioritized seating in order
of earliest confirmed reservations. The agent seated three
passengers with later booking dates ahead of the Kaplans.
The court found this act constituted unjust discrimination. 64 Although previous courts 65 had indicated that
overbooking itself could be willful conduct sufficient for
punitive awards, the Kaplan court barred punitive damages because there was no showing of deliberate and similar past conduct.66
Prior to 1978, the legal system granted passengers
some relief by allowing a statutory cause of action for unjust discrimination with a possibility of punitive damages.
In addition, the courts preserved those rights in the face
of CAB regulations. However, the legal system neutralized the full effects of those passenger rights by accepting
airline overbooking as a necessary practice, allowing the
airlines to generate their own boarding priority rules
which were published only in tariff forms on file with the
CAB, and restricting punitive damages.
-IId. The court found that "the passenger is able to prove that he possessed a
confirmed reservation ... and that this priority was not honored. This suffices to
establish that a preference or discrimination has occurred." Id.
62 Id. The plaintiffs in Archibald were awarded punitive damages after remand
upon the principles established. Heister, supra note 11, at 541 n.45.
12 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,933 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
Id. at 17,935.
Wills, 200 F. Supp. at 367-68.
Kaplan, 12 Av. Cas. at 17,934.
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NADER ESTABLISHES ANOTHER CLAIM: THE RISE AND
FALL OF FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION

Although early challenges to bumping used the antidiscrimination statutes, consumer advocate Ralph Nader
used common-law misrepresentation to challenge an
overbooking practice which resulted in his own bumping.67 In 1972, Allegheny Airlines denied Nader seating
on a flight from Washington D.C. to Hartford, Connecticut where he was to speak at a fund raising rally for the
Connecticut Citizens Action Group (CCAG). 68 The airline agent refused to determine whether anyone with
standby status had been allowed to board in preference to
Mr. Nader, who had a confirmed reservation, and refused
to ask for volunteers to give Nader a seat.6 9 The airline
then offered alternate travel arrangements which would
have caused Nader to miss his noon engagement, so Nader declined. 70 Nader and the CCAG joined as co-plaintiffs against the airline, 7' alleging unjust discrimination in
denial of boarding and fraudulent misrepresentation in
selling a "confirmed" reservation when the carrier deliberately and regularly overbooked flights.72 The resulting
,1 Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1973) [hereinafter Nader I] (holding airline liable on discrimination and fraudulent misrepresentation charges to Nader and to third party consumer group and awarding punitive
damages), rev'd, 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (reversing and remanding discrimination claim for lack of evidence, reversing misrepresentation claim because CAB
had primary jurisdiction, and holding third party consumer group too remote
from transaction to recover damages), rev 'd in part, 426 U.S. 290 (1976) (reviewing
only the issue of CAB's primary jurisdiction over the misrepresentation claim and
holding CAB did not have primary jurisdiction).
Nader I, 365 F. Supp. at 130.
Id.
7,, Id. Instead of his original arrival time of 11:15 a.m., the alternate flight
would have arrived at 12:10 p.m. The rally began at 12:15 p.m. with 1,000 persons in attendance. The crowd dwindled to 200 by the time Nader arrived. Id.
71

Id. at 129.

The unjust discrimination claim was based on Federal Aviation Act of 1958
§ 404(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b), repealedby Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95504, § 1551(a)(2)(B), 92 Stat. 1905 (1982) (effective Jan. 1, 1983)..Vader I at 132.
The Federal Aviation Act section 1106 provided a savings clause: "Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing
at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to
such remedies." 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1982). Thus plaintiffs could bring both
72
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litigation became the first bumping case to reach the
United States Supreme Court.
The trial court held for Nader on the discrimination
charge under section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act
of 195873 and for both Nader and the CCAG on commonlaw misrepresentation. 4 The court held that substantial
overbooking without disclosure of the practice to the public constituted wanton, malicious behavior toward the passenger and the consumer group. The court awarded
Nader compensatory damages of $10 and punitive damages of $25,000. 75 The CCAG received $51 in nominal
damages and $25,000 in punitives.76
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded upon several
grounds." The court agreed that Nader had established a
prima facie case of discrimination, 78 but concluded that
the evidence did not clearly show that Allegheny failed to
follow its own boarding priority rules. 79 The appellate
court remanded for further findings on Allegheny's
boarding rules and the gate agent's credibility.80 The
court reversed the recovery by the CCAG as well, holding
that the organization was too remote from the transaction
and, thus, was not within the class of persons protected by
statutory discrimination claims and common law claims for the same incident. See
Tice, supra note 1, at 12 n.59.
7 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b), repealed by Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-504,
§ 1551(a)(2)(B), 92 Stat. 1905 (1982) (effectiveJan. 1, 1983).
74 Nader 1, 365 F. Supp. at 132. In its finding of fact, the district court concluded that Allegheny Airlines' overbooking practices were "substantial." id. at
130. It cited statistics indicating that in April of 1972 Allegheny bumped 945
persons, including 48 on the Washington-Hartford route alone. Id. at 130-31.
From January 1969 to August 1972, a total of 15,929 persons with confirmed reservations were denied boarding on Allegheny flights due to overbooking. Id.
75

Id. at 134.

Id.
Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975) [hereinafter
Nader II], revd in part, 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
Id. at 539.
I7
71, Id. at 540. The airline's manual supported the evidence that the agent did
comply with the gate check-in procedures. Id.
- Id. at 541.
76

77
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the statute.8 The court of appeals also stated with respect to the misrepresentation claim that the CAB, as regulatory agency, had primary jurisdiction to determine
whether Allegheny had fraudulently misrepresented its
overbooking practice. 2 It stayed the district court action
pending a determination by the CAB. 8 3 If the overbooking practices proved to be deceptive, the trial court upon
remand also had to consider Allegheny's good faith defense that the airline believed overbooking to be condoned by the CAB.8 4
The Supreme Court granted certiorari solely on the issue of whether the CAB had primary jurisdiction over the
fraudulent misrepresentation claim. 85 Reversing the appellate decision, the Court held that the common-law
claim could proceed without CAB's initial finding of deception.86 In making this determination, the Court
looked to the savings clause of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958.87 The Court stated that the CAB powers were to be
supplemental to common-law causes of action, with the
CAB able to provide an injunctive remedy8 to protect the
public interest against deceptive practices or unfair com''
Id. at 549. The CCAG was a "member of a vast indeterminate class that may
be equated with the public itself." Id. "[F]oreseeability is not the test to be used
in determining the class of third persons who may recover; otherwise, liability in a
case such as this could become indeterminate." Id. The court therefore held that
Allegheny's duty did not extend to CCAG. Id.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 546.
"4

Id. at 551-52.

Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976) [hereinafter Nader III].
Id. at 301-02.
87 Id. at 298; see Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 1106, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506
(1982); see supra note 72 for the text of section 1106.
- Nader 111, 426 U.S. at 301 (interpreting the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
§ 411, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1381 (1982)). This section provided that:
The Board may ...

investigate and determine whether any air car-

rier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent has been or is engaged in
unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition in air
transportation or the sale thereof. If the Board shall find, after notice and hearing, that such air carrier ...is engaged in such unfair or
deceptive practices ... it shall order such air carrier ...to cease and

desist from such practices or methods of competition.
Id. at 296 n.7.
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petition. 89 Because the failure to disclose overbooking
did not involve a tariff practice or similar technical question of fact uniquely within the CAB's expertise, the CAB
did not have primary jurisdiction on the discrimination or
the misrepresentation claims. 90 In summary, the Supreme
Court left in place the common-law cause of action for
misrepresentation without intervention by the CAB. The
Court did not disturb the statutory discrimination claim
with its established elements and burden of proof, nor did
it resurrect the third party claim by the CCAG which had
been denied by the court of appeals as too remote.
Thus, after the Nader Supreme Court decision, the
bumped passenger had a choice of several remedies depending on his circumstances. He could elect to accept
denied boarding compensation or alternate travel arrangements on a contractual theory. Either choice would
constitute liquidated damages and foreclose further common-law action. In the alternative, the bumped passenger
could decline the compensation and pursue either the unjust discrimination claim as provided by statute, or a common-law claim for misrepresentation, with compensatory
and punitive damages available. 9 '
After the Supreme Court decision, Nader went back to
the district court for reconsideration. 92 Five years after its
initial decision, the district court incorporated the decisions of the two higher courts and gave a detailed
explanation of discrimination and fraudulent misrepresentation.
On the 404(b) discrimination claim, the district court
again recognized that Nader established his prima facie
case by showing that he had a confirmed reservation, had
complied with preboarding conditions, 93 and that the carId. at 301.
Id. at 305.
See Tice, supra note 1, at 18-19, for detailed evaluation of Nader I, Nader II, and
Nader III.
1"2 Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 168 (D.D.C. 1978) [hereinafter Nader IV].
,:,
Id. at 172. Compliance with preboarding conditions is a requirement which
"

1989]

COMMENTS

1149

rier refused to honor his reservation. 4 Nader further
showed that the airline did not honor his reservation because the flight was oversold.95 The burden of proof then
shifted to the airline to prove compliance with its boarding priority rules.9 6 Carefully comparing the Allegheny
Passenger Service Manual with the gate agent's testimony,
the court found that the airline failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it complied with its own
rules.97 The court therefore held Allegheny liable for violation of section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 and allowed Nader to recover compensatory damages. 98 Enumerating the elements of the common-law tort
of fraudulent misrepresentation, 99 the court concluded
that Nader had proved each one by preponderance of the
courts applied strictly in finding that plaintiffs have established a prima facie case.
The preboarding conditions established by airlines are contained in tariffs filed
with the CAB (since deregulation with the Department of Transportation).
Preboarding conditions generally require that passengers check in at the gate a
certain length of time prior to departure, which ranges up to an hour before international flights. Those passengers who are not checked in by that time are considered "no-shows" and their seats are then available for other passengers. See, e.g.,
Wolgel v. Mexicana Airlines, 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (21 Av. Cas.) 17,317, 17,319
(Feb. 29, 1988), infra notes 196-207 and accompanying text, for strict application
of compliance with preboarding arrival time. For current regulations, see 14
C.F.R. § 250.6(a) (1988).
t.. Nader IV, 445 F. Supp. at 172.
115 Id. Another reason for bumping which is excepted by current regulations is
lack of space caused by a substitution of equipment required for operational or
safety reasons. 14 C.F.R. § 250.6(b) (1988). Bumping due to a substitution of
equipment for safety reasons would not be grounds for a suit by the passenger. Id.
!,,, Nader IV, 445 F. Supp. at 172.
97 Id. Although gate agent McDonald testified that he had followed Allegheny's
boarding priority procedure, the court found that two internal memoranda, prepared by Allegheny within a week after the Nader bumping, contradicted McDonald's testimony, making it neither credible nor trustworthy. Id. at 173. These
memoranda showed that two persons were boarded who had boarding priorities
lower than Nader, one who had been wait-listed and one who had been cancelled
initially as a "no-show"! Id.
,- Id. The actual amount of compensatory damages was still limited to ten dollars, which equalled the extra cost of a later ticket and long-distance telephone
calls. Id.
so Id. at 174. Elements required by the court for the plaintiff to recover are:
"(1) A false representation (2) in reference to a material fact (3) made with knowledge of its falsity (4) and with the intent to deceive (5) with action taken in reliance upon the representation." Id.
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evidence.'°" The airline at no time, either through tariffs,
advertising, or other communication, disclosed to the
public its practice of overbooking.' 0 ' The airline's nondisclosure of its overbooking procedures gave air travellers a false expectation of their chance of having a seat on
0 2
a given flight.'
The court then applied to the airline a general duty in a
business transaction not to suppress or conceal material
facts. 0 3 If the airline made any representation at all about
its reservation system, the court required full and fair disclosure of all airline records and procedures, including
overbooking.' 0 4 Finally, the court rejected Allegheny's
"good faith" defense which asserted that the airline believed its policy of overbooking to be lawful and sanctioned by the CAB.' 0 5 The court again found Nader
entitled to an award of punitive damages, but lowered the
amount to $15,000. 106
Allegheny Airlines appealed the decision on the fraudulent misrepresentation claim and the punitive damage
Id.
Id.

1(1

H2Id.

... Id. at 175. The court recognized that in its jurisdiction one who speaks is
under a well-established duty " 'not only to state truly what he tells,' but also not
to 'suppress or conceal any facts within his own knowledge which materially qualify those stated. If he speaks at all he must make full and fair disclosure.' " Id.
(citations omitted).
"- Id.

Id. at 177. In 1967, the CAB rejected a proposed rule that required airlines
to give passengers twelve-hour notice of an overbooked condition of a flight. The
airline argued that the CAB's rejection of this rule implied that general nondisclosure was an acceptable practice. Id. The CAB, however, rejected the proposed
rule because it felt such short notice would create confusion, alarm, bitterness,
and cancellations. Id. The court stated that general disclosure would not give rise
to these same problems and concluded'that the CAB's rejection of the proposed
twelve-hour notice rule "in no way sanctioned the absolute and wanton failure of
Allegheny to provide any notice of its overbooking practice while continuing to
assure passengers that they had 'confirmed reservations.' " Id.
1'; Id. at 178-79. The court lowered the award from the original $25,000 to
$15,000 after considering the entire record and the airline's "good faith" arguments. Id. The court found the lower amount to be adequate to punish the airline and deter similar behavior in the future. Id. The court, however, also
recognized that this amount of punitive damages would not compensate Nader for
the attorney's fees incurred in the extensive litigation of the case. Id.

1989]

COMMENTS

1151

award.10 7 The D.C. Circuit again reversed the trial court's
judgment on misrepresentation. The court of appeals
held that the trial court was clearly erroneous in its decision because the evidence failed to sustain two elements
of the fraudulent misrepresentation cause of action.'
The airline lacked intent to deceive Nader because
overbooking was public information, openly discussed. 0 9
The airline's failure to disclose overbooking did not play a
material and substantial part in leading Nader to book Allegheny's flight because Nader was aware of overbooking
and was also aware that he could not rely on a confirmed
reservation as a guarantee." 0 The court of appeals also
reversed the punitive damage award, although the decision on misrepresentation obviated the need for damages.
The court found that Allegheny's behavior was not willful,
wanton or malicious because the CAB had expressed approval of overbooking." I' The final disposition of the Nader case established that a cause of action for fraudulent
misrepresentation was possible, but plaintiffs were unlikely to satisfy the elements of the claim because of the
CAB regulations. The lasting significance of the litigation
probably lies in the affirmation by the Supreme Court that
common law remedies are still available to passengers
2
who do not accept compensation."
Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 626 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
. Id. at 1036-37.
1,,7

Id.
Id. at 1037. Nader "knew the facts" of bumping, having been bumped in
April 1972 by American Airlines, two days before making his Allegheny reservations, and in 1971 by Eastern Airlines. Id.
". Id. at 1035. The court noted that the Civil Aeronautics Board "publicly and
formally expressed its approval" of overbooking by declining to issue a rule requiring airlines to give notice of an overbooked flight. Id.
11 See Magathan & Franks, Domestic Airline PassengerRemedies, 48J. AIR L. & CoM.
647, 659 (1983). Magathan and Franks noted that in light of the public information about overbooking, and the discussion among carriers and by the CAB, future recovery based on misrepresentation was "probably stillborn." Id. at 660.
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LEGAL RESPONSE AFTER NADER: MANY OPTIONS,

LITrLE MONEY

With the definitive acceptance of a common law claim
by the Nader court and the apparent availability of punitive
damages, airlines were concerned about a significant increase in litigation and the possibility of large punitive
damage awards." 3 The possibility of consequential damages for missed business appointments, social engage4
ments, or family affairs seemed equally threatening."
From the opposite perspective, the passage of the Airline
Deregulation Act in 1978 encouraged some consumer
groups to expect more responsiveness from the airlines
due to the planned abandonment of the tariff system of
regulations." 5 Whether, in fact, the legal system shifted
toward either the airline or the consumer requires examination of current case law on the available causes of action
and remedies. A brief summary of the changes in the regulations is necessary background for an understanding of
the cases.
A.

Regulations Currently Applicable to Overbooking

Congress deregulated the airline industry with the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.' 6 The Act amended the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, repealing section 404(b),
the basis for the discrimination claim." 7 The plan under
deregulation included phasing out most economic regulation by 1983 and terminating the Civil Aeronautics Board
":, See Tice, supra note I, at 22-33. Tice was legal assistant at Texas International Airlines when writing this article. His sections titled, "The Spectre of Pandora's Box: Carriers are Subject to Punitive Damages for both Discrimination and
Misrepresentation," id. at 22, and "The Ultimate Liability: Consequential Damages," id. at 30, reflect the airlines' grave concern over the possibility of litigation
by every bumped passenger.
Id. at 30-33.
Hitchcock, supra note 17. Hitchcock was an associate director of the Aviation Consumer Action Project in Washington, D.C. He felt that the tariff system
was anticonsumer in practice, and that cancellation of the tariffs would "mak[e] it
easier for aggrieved passengers to pursue their claims in court." Id. at 34.
1 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 102, 92 Stat. 1705.
117 49 U.S.C. app. § 1551(a)(2)(B) (1982).
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by 1985.1'8 Congress did, however, maintain the oversales regulations promulgated by the CAB, including requirements for denied boarding compensation, which
were collected in 14 C.F.R. section 250.119 The Office of
the Secretary, Department of Transportation, assumed
administration of these regulations after the CAB ceased
to exist.' 20 Thus 14 C.F.R. section 250, entitled "Oversales", still regulates airline conduct and passenger rights.
As these regulations currently exist, in the event of an
oversold flight, the carrier must first request volunteers to
give up their seats in return for denied boarding compensation. 21 If there are not enough volunteers, the carrier
may then deny boarding to other passengers based on the
carrier's own boarding priority rules. 22 It must establish
these boarding priority rules so as not to discriminate
against anyone. 23 The carrier must file tariffs specifying
compensation for denied boarding equal to double the
ticket price up to $400.124 If the carrier also arranges
comparable air transportation or other transportation
which gets the passenger to his destination within two
hours of his originally scheduled arrival time, the maximum compensation is $200.125
Id.

Magathan & Franks, supra note 112, at 655.
14 C.F.R. § 250 editorial note (1988) (List of Sections Affected). The List of
C.F.R. Sections Affected appears at the end of each Code part.
-1 14 C.F.R. § 250.2b(a) (1988). This section defines a "volunteer" as "[a] person who responds to the carrier's request for volunteers and who willingly accepts
the carriers' offer of compensation, in any amount, in exchange for relinquishing
the confirmed reserved space." Id.
12._14 C.F.R. § 205.2b(b) (1988).
123 14 C.F.R. § 250.3 (1988).
The nondiscrimination of this section is similar in
wording to the antidiscrimination provision of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
section 404(b). See supra note 26 for that text. The current regulation provides
that boarding rules and criteria "[s]hall not make, give, or cause any undue or
unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person or subject any particular person to any unjust or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever." 14 C.F.R. § 250.3(a) (1988).
1,2,14 C.F.R. § 250.4 (1988). The airlines may also offer free or reduced rate
air transportation in lieu of cash payment. 14 C.F.R. § 250.5(b) (1988). The actual amount of compensation is specified in section 250.5(a).
125 14 C.F.R. § 250.5(a) (1988).
12,,
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In some situations, a passenger denied boarding involuntarily from an oversold flight may not be eligible for
denied boarding compensation.' 26 A passenger is not eligible for denied boarding compensation if he has not

complied with the airline's procedures for ticketing, reconfirmation, check-in, or if he does not meet the airline's
criteria for acceptability for transportation. 27 Nor is compensation required if bumping is caused by substituting
equipment of lesser capacity for operational or safety reasons. 28 If the airline offers the passenger a seat in a section of the airplane other than the one ticketed the
passenger is not entitled to compensation if he refuses the

offer.' 29 Finally, if the airline arranges for alternate transportation which arrives within one hour of the originally
scheduled arrival time, the carrier is not required to com30
pensate the passenger.
The airline must provide a detailed written explanation
of denied boarding compensation and boarding priorities
to all passengers who are denied boarding involuntarily.' 3 ' Although the explanation need not specify that
the compensation constitutes liquidated damages, it must

state that the passenger has a right to refuse compensation and bring private legal action.' 32 As of 1986, the air-,; 14 C.F.R. § 250.6 (1988).
,21 14 C.F.R. § 250.6(a) (1988). The regulation does not define "acceptability
for transportation."
128 14 C.F.R. § 250.6(b) (1988).
129 14 C.F.R. § 250.6(c) (1988).
Note, however, that ifa passenger is seated in a
section for which a lower fare is charged, he shall be entitled to an appropriate
refund. Id.
.. 14 C.F.R. § 250.6(d) (1988). If the alternate flight is scheduled to arrive
more than one hour after the original arrival time, but not more than two hours
after, the airline must offer compensation equal to the ticket price in addition to
the flight, up to a maximum of two hundred dollars. 14 C.F.R. § 250.5(a) (1988).
,:, 14 C.F.R. § 250.9(a) (1988). The written statement prescribed by the regulation includes an explanation of denied boarding compensation, an explanation
of the procedure of requesting volunteers to give up their seats, an explanation of
compensation for involuntary denied boarding, an explanation of the amount of
compensation to be paid, method of payment, and a statement of the passenger's
options. 14 C.F.R. § 250.9(b) (1988). Significantly, the airline must also include a
summary of the airline's boarding priority rules, written "in a manner to be understandable to the average passenger." Id.
,32 14 C.F.R. § 250.8(b) (1988). To make it clear that the passenger may either
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lines must file quarterly reports with the Department of
Transportation of the number of passengers denied
boarding.' 31 In addition, airlines must give public notice
of the deliberate practice of overbooking by posting an
explanation of this practice on clearly visible signs with
lettering one quarter inch high 34 and by including an explanation with each ticket sold. 35 The regulation dictates
36
the exact wording of the public disclosure notices.
Thus, in the last decade, the regulations have more precisely defined both the obligation of air carriers to disclose the practice of overbooking and the procedures an
airline must follow when bumping does occur. On the
other hand, the regulations still have not restricted the
practice of overselling itself.
B.

Case Law On Overbooking

A number of passengers have filed suit against airlines
for bumping in the last ten years. Most passengers make
multiple allegations in their complaints, but significant
discussion tends to center on certain claims. For convenience, the cases examined in this article are grouped by
the most viable claim in each case.
accept compensation or bring suit, the written statement must include under passenger's options a statement that "the passenger may decline the payment and
seek to recover damages in a court of law or in some other manner." Id.
-, 14 C.F.R. § 250.10 (1988).
1:.4 14 C.F.R. § 250.11(a) (1988).
The notice must state that "[a]irline flights
may be overbooked and there is a slight chance that a seat will not be available on
a flight for which a person has a confirmed reservation." Id. The notice also includes a summary of the denied boarding compensation procedures. Id.
.... 14 C.F.R. § 250.11(b) (1988).

-,; 14 C.F.R. § 250.11 (a) (1988). Compliance with this regulation could effectively foreclose claims for fraudulent misrepresentation after October 16, 1984,
the date the regulation was promulgated. See, e.g., Mendelson v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 120 Misc. 2d 423, 466 N.Y.S.2d 168, 171 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (holding that
as TWA fully complied with CAB regulations governing disclosure, no cause of
action could be maintained for fraudulent misrepresentation and false advertising). For further discussion of Mendelson, see infra notes 150-154 and accompanying text.
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1. Misrepresentation
Following the Nader decision, plaintiffs in a bumping
case frequently brought multiple causes of action including both discrimination and misrepresentation. Misrepresentation claims have proven difficult to sustain if the
passenger accepted denied boarding compensation or alternate travel arrangements. Two decisions by United
States Courts of Appeal in 1980 affirmed lower court decisions that accepting compensation or alternate travel arrangements forecloses misrepresentation claims. In
Christensen v. Northwest Airlines,1 37 the Ninth Circuit reviewed a case in which Christensen and her two children
were bumped in Spokane on the first leg of a flight to Hawaii. Northwest Airlines promptly arranged alternate
travel so that the family arrived one hour and thirty-eight
minutes after the originally scheduled arrival time.' 38 The
trial court concluded that the then existing CAB provision 139 deeming denied boarding compensation to be liquidated damages also applied to alternate travel
arrangements. 4 0 The court held that the plaintiff made a
binding election so that common-law remedies were no
1:.7 633 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1980) [hereinafter Christensen II]; see infra note 140
and accompanying text for discussion of Christensen v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
455 F. Supp. 492 (D. Haw. 1978) [hereinafter Christensen I], affd, 633 F.2d 529
(9th Cir. 1980).
Christensen 11, 633 F.2d at 530.
Id. The regulations applicable at the time were 14 C.F.R. §§ 250.6, 250.7
(1974). Section 250.6 provided that "a passenger [was] ineligible for denied
boarding compensation if the carrier arrange[d] transportation accepted by the
passenger which is scheduled to arrive at the passenger's destination within two
hours of the planned arrival time of the originally scheduled flight." See Christensen
11, 633 F.2d at 530 n.I for the text of the regulation as it existed in 1974. Section
250.7 provided that acceptance of denied boarding compensation constituted liquidated damages for all damages incurred by the passenger as a result of the denial of boarding. Id.
14, Christensen 1, 455 F.Supp. at 494. The trial court followed Rousseff v, Western Airlines, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1262, 1263 (C.D. Cal. 1976), which held that acceptance and use of rerouted tickets constituted liquidated damages for all
damages suffered by the plaintiff, including those for unjust discrimination and
infliction of emotional harm. See also Roman v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 441 F. Supp.
1160, 1165-66 (N.D. III. 1977) (holding that passenger's acceptance of denied
boarding compensation barred both statutory and common law claims).
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longer available to her for other damages caused by being
bumped from her flight.' 4 ' The court of appeals specifically affirmed this holding'4 2 and construed the acceptance of alternative air transportation to be equivalent to
43
the acceptance of denied boarding compensation.
The Eighth Circuit reached the same conclusion in Wasserman v. Trans World Airlines.'44 Wasserman had arrived at
7:50 a.m. for his 8:00 a.m. flight, by which time passengers in line had already boarded. 45 The airline did not
tender denied boarding compensation, but arranged alternate travel which arrived within two hours of the scheduled arrival time. 1 46 The trial court relied on the
Christensen district court decision 47 to find Wasserman's
state law claim for misrepresentation barred as a matter of
law' 48 because of his acceptance of liquidated damages.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, although not in the same
strong language the Ninth Circuit used in Christensen. The
Eighth Circuit simply used a "clearly erroneous" standard
to find that the judge had correctly applied the relevant
...
Christensen 1, 455 F. Supp. at 494. Christensen alleged that the airline agents
were rude and discourteous, that the incident left her "greatly anguished and upset, rendered anxious, nervous, angry and ill," and she then prayed for $25,000
general damages and $25,000 punitive damages. Id. at 493.
,42Christensen HI, 633 F.2d at 530. The court stated that its interpretation was
consistent with comments to 14 C.F.R. section 250.6(b) which said that the regulation gave the passenger the option of accepting denied boarding compensation
or other transportation arriving at the specified time. Id. (citing comments to
C.A.B. Order No. ER-588, 44 Fed. Reg. 14,282 (1969)).
,4:1
Id. The court found that her tort claim for humiliation and embarrassment
could not be heard in federal court. Although Christensen sued for damages exceeding the $10,000 minimum for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section
1332, the court found that she did not make this claim for damages in good faith.
Id. at 530-31.
., 632 F.2d 69, 71 (8th Cir. 1980) [hereinafter Wasserman II]; see infra note 145
and accompanying text for a discussion of Wasserman v. Trans World Airlines,
486 F. Supp. 194 (W.D. Mo. 1980) [hereinafter Wasserman I], aftd, 632 F.2d 69
(8th Cir. 1980).
,- Wasserman I, 486 F. Supp. at 195.
1- Id. at 196.
147 Id. at 198. The court also cited Rousseff, 409 F. Supp. at 1262, in support
of
Its holding that acceptance of alternate travel as liquidated damages barred a
plaintiff's federal and state law claims. Wasserman I, 486 F. Supp. at 198.
","Id. at 197. In addition, this court found both federal and state tort claims
barred. Id. at 198.
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law. 149
Thus, because the claims were barred by the liquidated
damages clause specified by the regulations, both courts
declined to evaluate whether continued overbooking of
confirmed reservations constituted fraudulent misrepresentation. In 1983, however, a New York state court did
consider the issue of fraudulent misrepresentation with
respect to overbooking practices. In Mendelson v. Trans
World Airlines, 150 the court noted that following Nader, the
CAB promulgated a new regulation requiring airlines to
post a public notice of the practice of overbooking as well
as to include such notice with each ticket sold. 15 1 Mendelson asserted that failure to disclose overbooking in other
forms of publication, such as advertisements, even when
the airline was in compliance with the new regulation,
constituted misrepresentation. 152 The trial court held
that the airline had no duty of disclosure beyond that
stated in the regulation. 153 Any extension of the duty was
for the CAB or the legislature to make, not the
judiciary. 154

Thus, fraudulent misrepresentation claims seem very
difficult to sustain since the high-water mark of Nader.
The discussion of the problem increased public awareness
and spurred the CAB to require public disclosure of
overbooking practices. However, so long as the airline
complies with the regulation, 155 it protects itself from a
successful allegation of nondisclosure, the basis of the
claim in Nader. In addition, it is clear that the passenger
forecloses all common law claims if he accepts any form of
1' Wasserman II, 632 F.2d at 71.
,o 120 Misc. 2d 423, 466 N.Y.S.2d 168 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
ol Id. at 425, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 170. This notice is codified at 14 C.F.R. § 250.11
(1988).
Mendelson, 120 Misc. 2d at 425, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 170.
Id. at 425, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 170.
Id. at 425, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 170. The court stated that "any argument that
CAB regulations governing disclosure should be amended must be made to either
the CAB or the legislature." Id. (citation omitted).
,.-14 C.F.R. § 250.11(a) (1988); see supra note 134 for a partial text of this
regulation.
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denied boarding compensation, either payment for tickets
or other travel arrangements. 156 Thus, a successful misrepresentation claim today would require an exacting set
of circumstances. First, the airline must fail to comply
with regulations on notices about overbooking. Second,
the airline would probably have to affirmatively represent
that a confirmed reservation guaranteed a seat on a given
flight in advertising or other promotional literature, thus
meeting the elements of misrepresentation. 157 Finally,
the passenger must decline all compensation offered at
the time he is bumped, and must make his own alternate
travel arrangements at his own expense. Even if the passenger meets these requirments, he awaits uncertain results in the court system. Thus the airlines are probably
in a stronger position currently than pre-Nader due to increased protection afforded by compliance with the regulation. The rash of punitive awards for misrepresentation
feared by the airlines in bumping cases has not
materialized.
2.

Discrimination

After litigation based on discrimination claims under
section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958158
proved successful, many of the subsequent cases included
allegations of discrimination. Since Congress repealed
the section underlying these claims159 pursuant to the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,160 the practitioner must
keep in mind the chronology of the statute when examining cases with discrimination claims. Discrimination cases
filed before 1958 fell under section 404(b) of the Civil
151iSee supra notes 137-148 and accompanying text.
17 See supra note 99 for elements of a misrepresentation claim.
1" 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b), repealed by Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95504, § 1551(a)(2)(B), 92 Stat. 1905 (1982) (effective Jan. 1, 1983); see supra note
26 for text of antidiscrimination clause; see supra notes 25-66 and accompanying
text for court cases establishing elements and remedies of a discrimination claim.
159 49 U.S.C. app. § 1551 (a)(2)(B) (1982) (repealing earlier section "except insofar as such section requires air carriers to provide safe and effective service").
...See supra note 116 for citation to the Airline Deregulation Act.
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Aeronautics Act of 1938.161 Claims brought after 1958
fell under section 404(b) the Federal Aviation Act of
1958.162 Most of the recent case law refers to this 1958
provision.16 3 As previously noted, Congress specifically
repealed section 404(b),1 64 effective January 1, 1983.
Thus, causes of action which arose prior to January 1,
1983 were viable under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.
Current claims may not have the same statutory basis
available. Nevertheless, understanding the discrimination
cases is important for two reasons. First, discrimination
issues frequently arise in courts' written decisions on
bumping, so that research on bumping requires familiarity with the discrimination claim. Second, the discrimination claim may still be available under the regulations
passed in June 1983. ' 65 These regulations specify the
boarding priority rules "shall not make, give, or cause any
undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any
particular person or subject any particular person to any
unjust or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any
respect whatsoever."'' 66 Discrimination under the regulation is as yet untested, however.
Most of the litigation for bumping based on discrimination after the early Fitzgerald case1 6 1 was not racially motivated. Two court of appeals cases in 1978 reiterated that
discrimination need not be racial to be unjust. However,
sizable awards for nonracial discrimination are rare. In
....
See supra note 26 for text.
"6 See supra note 26 for text.

-,: See Heister, supra note 11, for an article reviewing the majority of case law
through 1974 under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 section 404(b).
164 49 U.S.C. app. § 1551(a)(2)(B) (1982).
14 C.F.R. § 250.3(a) (1988) (includes an antidiscrimination clause).
Id. The intent to preserve a rule against discriminatory practices is apparent
in the written commentary to the regulation changes. "The current rule allocates
the risk of being denied boarding among travellers by requiring airlines to solicit
volunteers and use a non-discriminatory boarding procedure." Economic Regulations Amendment 19 to Section 250, 47 Fed. Reg. 52,980 (1982) (to be codified
at 14 C.F.R. § 250).
167 See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text for discussion of the Fitzgerald
decision.
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Smith v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc. ,168 Smith had a confirmed
reservation through Delta, for a Piedmont Aviation flight
from Atlanta, Georgia to Bluefield, West Virginia in 1974
to participate in a friend's wedding.' 69 He complied with
all airline preflight procedures1 70 but was bumped by the
airline agent, along with seven others, in violation of the
airline's own boarding priority rules.17' Piedmont refused
to remove Smith's luggage from the plane, tendered denied boarding compensation which Smith refused to cash,
and offered standby status on a subsequent flight which
was also full. 172 Smith finally booked a flight to Roanoak,
Virginia, and drove into Bluefield several hours late for
the wedding rehearsal and dinner. M The trial court
found that the airline unjustly discriminated against Smith
74
by its failure to follow its own boarding priority rules.
The trial court awarded both compensatory damages for
actual expenses, emotional distress and humiliation, and
punitive damages for the airline's knowing violation of its
own boarding priority rules. 75 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the compensatory damages, indicating that
the award was generous, but did not "shock the judicial
412 F. Supp. 641 (N.D. Tex. 1976) [hereinafter Smith I], affd in part and revd
in part, 567 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1978).
,- Smith v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 567 F.2d 290, 291 (5th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter Smith II].
'17' Id. at 291.
Smith reconfirmed his reservation twice before departure and
checked into the boarding gate two hours prior to departure time. Not wanting to
stand in a long line, however, he did not line up at the first boarding call, thinking
his confirmed reservation assured him a seat. Id.
'7' Id. Piedmont's boarding priority rules provided for seating passengers in
the order of time and date of booking reservations. By seating passengers in order of the first to line up, the agent used a first-come, first-served rule. However,
the agent contended he was under verbal instructions to "get the flight out on
time" and that checking booking times and dates would have delayed the flight
several hours. Id. at 292.
172Id. at 291.
17.3 Id.
174 Smith 1, 412 F. Supp. at 643.
175 Id. The trial court awarded $51.80 for actual damages in the amount paid
for a rental car, $1000 for emotional distress and humiliation, and $1,500 for punitive damages for Piedmont's "knowing and continuing violation of its boarding
priority rules." Id.
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conscience."' 7 6 However, it reversed the punitive damage
acaward, because the airline did not exhibit "evil motive,
1' 77
tual malice, deliberate violence, or oppression.'
The Seventh Circuit rendered a similar decision in the
same year in Karp v. North Central Airlines. 178 North Central Airlines bumped Ms. Karp and her children from a
flight on which she had confirmed reservations. 79 The
airline boarded passengers on a first-come, first-served
basis, contrary to its boarding policy on file with the
CAB. 180 The trial court found that the airline violated the
antidiscrimination provision of section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.181 Karp received actual damages of three dollars and punitive damages of $2,000 from
the trial court. 82 The Seventh Circuit reversed the award
of punitive damages, citing both Nader and Smith for the
requirements of wanton, malicious, and oppressive behavior necessary to sustain punitive damages. 8 3 The court
applied the requirements to the airline's failure to file a
boarding priority rule that corresponded with its actual
practice rather than to the airline agent's behavior toward
Karp.' 84 The behavior which the court evaluated was that
,- Smith II, 567 F.2d at 292.
171

Id. The Fifth Circuit cited the Nader !! court of appeals decision for the ele-

ments required to award punitive damages. Id.; see supra notes 67-111 and accompanying text for a discussion of all the Nader decisions.
17- 437 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Wis. 1977) [hereinafter Karp I], afd in part and rev'd in
part, 583 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1978).
,71,Karp v. North Cent. Airlines, 583 F.2d 364, 365 (7th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter
Karp II]. Karp was travelling home with her twenty-one month old child and her
ten-month old child who was recovering from surgery. Id. at 365.
-, Id. at 366. The plaintiff also advanced an argument that a first-come, firstserved boarding priority rule constituted invidious discrimination against the infirm which the court of appeals rejected as unsupported. Id. at 366 n.6.
1.1Karp 1, 437 F. Supp. at 90. The airline filed a third-party complaint against
the travel agent who booked Ms. Karp on the flight, alleging that the error of that
agent caused the overbooking. Id. at 91. The trial court dismissed this claim on
the ground that only the airline had violated the boarding priority rules and discriminated against the passenger. Id. The airline did not appeal the dismissal.
Karp 11, 583 F.2d at 365 n.2.
112 Karp 11, 583 F.2d at 365.
-, Id. at 365-66.
,,4 Id. at 366.
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of the airline as a whole and not that of its agent toward
individual passengers.
The Ninth Circuit found the claim of unjust discrimination actionable by a handicapped individual in Hingson v.
Pacific Southwest Airlines.'18 The airline agent denied
boarding to Hingson, a blind passenger with a confirmed
reservation, because the front row seats were full. 8 6 The
agent claimed that airline policy required handicapped
passengers to sit in the front row. 8 7 Hingson boarded
the next flight but refused to take a front row seat, and
88
was escorted from the plane by the Los Angeles police.
The trial court directed a verdict for the airline on all issues except a section 404(b) discrimination claim.' 8 9 The
jury verdict on that claim favored the airline.' 9 0 Hingson's appeal of the jury verdict contested certain evidentiary rulings by the trial court"excluding expert testimony
for Hingson by an airline employee.' 9 ' The court of appeals approved Hingson's claim under section 404(b) because Hingson could show, through the excluded
testimony, that the airline's policy, stated in manuals and
filed tariffs, did not restrict blind passengers to front row
seats. 92 The court remanded the discrimination claim for
a new trial, though it upheld the directed verdict for the
airline on the other issues.' 93 The appellate court also
743 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1411.
1.7
' 'N

Id.
Id.

Id. Hingson's complaint had listed fourteen causes of action under state and
federal law, including infliction of emotional distress, assault, and false imprisonment. Id. at 1411, 1416.
Id. at 1411.

Id. at 1412.
11.2

Id. The airline's policy manuals stated that blind passengers could be al-

lowed to sit anywhere except by emergency exits. Id.
11r,Id. at 1417. Discrimination under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 section
404(b) was the only claim which went forward. Hingson had alleged discrimination under two other statutes, the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 section 404(a) and
the Federal Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 1413-14. Section 404(a) of the Federal Aviation Act required carriers to provide "safe and adequate service, equipment, and
facilities in connection with such transportation," but it did not create a private
right of action. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1374(a) (1982); Hingson, 743 F.2d at 1408, 1414.
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noted that 404(b) had been repealed by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, effective January 1, 1983,194 but
Hingson's claim arose prior to the repeal. 95
The Seventh Circuit heard a case based on section
404(b) as recently as 1987-88. In Wolgel v. Mexicana Airlines,' 96 the cause of action arose in 1981 when Mexicana
Airlines bumped the Wolgels at O'Hare Airport from a
flight to Acapulco. Five years later, the passengers filed
suit for breach of contract and discriminatory bumping. 19 7
Since Mexicana was an international carrier and subject to
the provisions of the Warsaw Convention, 98 the trial
court held the Wolgels' claim was barred by the two-year
statute of limitations in the Convention.'9 9 The Seventh
Circuit disagreed on appeal, however, finding that the
Wolgels' claim fell outside the Warsaw Convention which
allowed action only for personal injury, loss of damage to
baggage, or delay of travel. 20 0 The Wolgels sought damages for bumping itself, which the court of appeals interpreted as total nonperformance of the contract as
opposed to delay of travel. 20 ' Therefore, the Illinois fiveIn addition, section 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act, preventing discrimination against the handicapped, did not apply because it related only to programs or
activities receiving federal financial assistance. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982); Hingson,
743 F.2d at 1414. Hingson claimed that money received by PSA for government
mail contracts constituted federal financial assistance. Hingson, 743 F.2d at 1414.
The court found according to CAB charts that PSA did not receive a government
subsidy for its mail contracts and held that the Rehabilitation Act did not apply.
Id. at 1415.
Hingson, 743 F.2d at 1411 n.l.
Id. at 1411.
821 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Wolgel I].
'17

Id. at 443.

[' Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, openedfor signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No.
876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention). The Warsaw Convention provides a two-year statute of limitations. Wolgel 1, 821 F.2d at 443.
':
lVolgel 1, 821 F.2d at 443-44.
-" Id. at 444.
Id. The court stated, "[t]he history of the Warsaw Convention indicates that
the drafters of the Convention did not intend the word 'delay' in Article 19 to
extend to claims, such as the Wolgels', that arise from the total nonperformance
of a contract." Id.
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year statute of limitations "for all actions not otherwise
provided for" applied.2 °2 The court remanded the case
for trial on the section 404(b) claim of unjust discrimination, holding that the remedy for bumping was limited to
the remedy provided by the home country.20 3 The court
noted that although section 404(b) was repealed during
deregulation, 20 4 a combination of the Illinois statute of
limitations and the federal savings clause preserved the
Wolgels' claim.20 5 Upon remand, however, the trial court
held that the Wolgels failed to establish a prima facie case
under 404(b) because they had not complied with the airline's preboarding conditions.20 6 Therefore, Mexicana
had no duty to provide seats, to ask for volunteers to
deplane, or to pay the Wolgels any oversale
compensation. 0 7
In all cases of discrimination, courts look closely at the
facts and circumstances to determine whether passengers
and airlines have complied literally with their respective
obligations before finding the airline responsible for even
relatively low amounts. Punitive damages are particularly
hard to sustain because the courts evaluate the overall
202 Id. at 444-46. The court summarized the applicable state provisions for statutes of limitations:
Illinois provides a two-year statute of limitation for personal injury
claims, see Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, para. 13-202 (Smith-Hurd 1984), a

ten -year statute of limitation for contract claims, see id. at para. 13206, and a five year statute of limitations for, among other things,
"all civil actions not otherwise provided for," see id. at para. 13-205.

Id. at 446. The court analyzed the section 404(b) discrimination claim as being
concerned with more than personal injury or breach of contract, and adopted the
five-year period as most appropriate. Id.
2-":1 Id. at 444-45. A cause of action for bumping under the Warsaw Convention
is outside the scope of this paper. However, there appears to be a difference of
opinion on the legitimacy of such a claim. See infra notes 284-289 for other cases
on this issue.
204 Wolgel 1, 821 F.2d at 443 n. 1.
205 Id. The federal saving statute cited is 1 U.S.C. § 109 (1982).
Id.
..... Wolgel v. Mexicana Airlines, 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (21 Av. Cas.)
17,317,
17,319 (Feb. 19, 1988) [hereinafter Wolgel II]. Mexicana's tariff on file with the
CAB required check-in at the ticket counter sixty minutes before flight time; the
Wolgels did not reach the counter until fifty-five minutes before flight time, missing the required time by five minutes. Id. at 17,318-19.
.. 2,7Id. at 17,319.
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conduct of the airline instead of considering solely the behavior of the individual airline agent involved in a particular bumping incident. Additionally, a private right of
action under the statute is no longer available if the incident occurred afterJanuary 1, 1983, when the statute was
repealed. 20 8 There is at least a possibility, however, that
discrimination is still actionable under the current regulations which specify that boarding rules shall not subject
any person to any unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage
in any respect. 20 9 The purpose of the regulation is to allocate the risk of being bumped among passengers by requiring airlines to solicit volunteers for later travel and by
requiring airlines to use nondiscriminatory boarding procedures.2 10' Thus presumably an airline who discriminates
in its boarding procedures is still liable under the current
regulations. To bring a successful claim for bumping,
however, the passenger will likely have to comply with
specific conditions in other regulations by meeting the
preboarding requirements of the airline and rejecting any
proffered compensation. As yet, however, there is no indication whether discrimination, the most common claim
by bumped passengers, will wither or revive after
deregulation.
3.

Breach of Contract

In addition to misrepresentation and discrimination
claims, plaintiffs look to state common law for other useful theories of liability, such as breach of contract and tortious infliction of emotional distress. As mentioned
earlier, the Wills court specifically affirmed that a state
common-law cause of action for breach of contract existed
in addition to the discrimination claim when a passenger
is bumped from a flight. 21 1 Although not used extensively
.Volgel 1, 821 F.2d at 443 n.1.
14 C.F.R. § 250.3 (1988); see supra note 123 for text of the antidiscrimination
provision in the regulations.
21.. See supra note 166 for citation regarding purpose from the Federal Register.
211 Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 365 (S.D. Cal. 1961);
see supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of 1ii//s.
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prior to deregulation, several decisions at the trial court
level have affirmed the usefulness of such claims since deregulation. Though not expressed in contract terms, a
New York City court in 1982 allowed a plaintiff to recover
from an airline apparently on a breach of contract theory.21 2 Plaintiff Levy had reservations on an Eastern Airlines flight which was delayed due to bad weather.2 13 The
Eastern agent made alternate reservations for Levy on a
Pan American flight which he confirmed three times.2 14
Just prior to departure, Pan American bumped Levy and
four family members. 2 5 Levy sued both airlines for denial of transportation and for insult and inconvenience. 16
The trial court found that Eastern had behaved in a reasonable manner, but that Pan American breached its duty
to the passenger. 1 7 The court evaluated both the passenger's rights and the airline's obligations under the applicable CAB regulations 218 and applied to Pan American a
new and superseding independent obligation to transport
the passengers. 2 9 These obligations were imposed in addition to the CAB regulations. The passengers had complied with all their requirements for ticketing, check in,
and confirmation, but the airline failed to meet its obligation to transport the passengers. The court awarded the
plaintiff damages in accordance with the regulations.22 °
Levy v. Eastern Airlines, 113 Misc. 2d 847,449 N.Y.S.2d 906 (Civ. Ct. 1982).
Id. at 847, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 907.
2-I

217

'

Id.

ld. at 847, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 909.

Id. at 847, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 907-08.
Id. at 847, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
Id. at 847, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
Id. The court quoted from a tariff rule on file with the CAB:
Tariff Rule 240(C)(1)(b) provides: "If the carrier causing such delay
(Eastern) . .. is unable to provide onward transportation acceptable
to the passenger, any other carrier, or combination of carriers, at the
request of the passenger, will transport the passenger without stopover on its next flight . . . if it will provide an earlier arrival at the
passenger's destination."

.... Id. at 847, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 908-09.
220 Id. at 847, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 909. Section 250.4 stated at that time that denied
boarding compensation was equal to the ticket price. However, if the airline
could not arrange another flight to the passenger's destination within two hours
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In Goranson v. Trans World Airlines, 22 ' another New York
22 2

court examined both the discrimination cause of action
and the Nader decision2 2 3 to establish a common-law contract cause of action. TWA bumped Goranson from a
flight booked as part of a tour package to England because the flight was overbooked.2 24 The tour included
items of special interest to Goranson, an avid horticulturist, who had saved and waited many years for the trip.225
She stated that she selected Trans World Airlines (TWA)
because of its "representations as to reliability and responsibility" particularly in the TWA brochure promoting
the tour.2 26 After bumping her, the airline finally arranged a flight for her two days after her scheduled departure, causing her to miss the most important features of
her trip. TWA then refused to allow her to revisit the
sights she had missed. TWA tendered denied boarding
compensation of $400, the maximum amount required by
the regulations,2 27 which Goranson refused. The court

of the scheduled arrival time, the compensation was doubled. The court award
was equal to twice the price of five one-way fares. Id. The court thus looked to the
regulations to provide a measure of damages, and the plaintiffs received the same
amount they would have received if they had accepted denied boarding compensation initially.
"2
121 Misc. 2d 68, 467 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Civ. Ct. 1983).
222 Goranson, 121 Misc. 2d at 68, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 778-79. The court concluded
that "a careful reading of the case law establishes that the airlines have not been
immunized from a State common law contract cause of action as a result of the
Federal Aviation Act." Id. at 68, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
22..Id. at 68, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 779-80. The court reasoned, "The Nader III case
unmistakably affirms the existence of common law tort liability and it is only a
mere corollary to hold that common law contract liability is viable." Id. at 68, 467
N.Y.S.2d at 780.
224 Id. at 68, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 775.
'1

ld. at 68, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 775. The credibility of this plaintiff is obvious

from the court's description of her as an "intelligent woman having a genuine
interest in gardening . . .a member of various horticultural associations" with a
"special personal interest in visiting the Savill Gardens." Id. at 68, 467 N.Y.S.2d
at 775.
2'1
Id. at 68, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 775. TWA's brochure promoting the tour read in
part, "Consider: with TWA there are no charter risks, no standby blues or airport
gambles. Every flight is scheduled, carrying with it the TWA reputation of reliability. You know in advance exactly where you'll fly from and when." Id. at 68, 467
N.W.2d at 775.
,_
7 Id. at 68, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 776.
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considered two issues: whether the carrier was liable
under simple common-law breach of contract, and
whether the amount of damages was limited exclusively
by the regulations on oversales. 22 8 The court reported no
other cases which awarded compensatory damages for
breach of contract by bumping. 229 The court examined
earlier decisions involving unjust discrimination 23 0 and
concluded that breach of contract still provided a viable
remedy, 23 I a conclusion supported by the analogous tort
liability under common law found by the Supreme Court
in Nader.23 2
Having thus grounded the action in contract, and having a plaintiff who had refused to accept the denied
boarding compensation as liquidated damages, the judge
went beyond the contract-based liquidated damages specified in the regulations, and awarded actual compensatory
damages, disregarding TWA's tariffs and the maximum
amounts specified in the CAB regulation.23 3 Those damages for Goranson included round trip airfare, ground
transportation, hotel, meal and tour expenses to recreate
the two days which TWA denied her by the bumping incident.23 4 The court also awarded her a small amount for
her extreme inconvenience, which presumably represented an "actual" damage item.235 Goranson established a
logical legal response to the bumping problem based on
228

Id. at 68, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 776.

,2,1!,
Id. at 68, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 775.
2:... Id. at 68, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
2:I
ld. at 68, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 780. The court noted the inconsistency between
the CAB's tacit approval of overbooking and the implied recognition that resultant bumping is a breach of contract as embodied by the regulations. Id. at 68,
467 N.Y.S.2d at 777. The court also noted the predominance of discrimination
and misrepresentation theories, presumably because plaintiffs had achieved little
success with breach of contract actions. Id. at 68, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
2:..

-. 1

Id. at 68, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 780.
Id. at 68, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 781.

2:1 Id. at 68, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 781.
These expenses came to $1,400. The maximum allowed by the regulation was $400.
-,
Id. at 68, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 781 (citing Wills, 200 F. Supp. at 366-67 (damages
available for humiliation and outrage) and Smith If, 567 F.2d at 292 (damages for
extreme inconvenience)). The Goranson court gave no rationale for an "inconvenience" element in contract damages.
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breach of contract. The court stated its decision was a
substantial remedy, particularly useful for persons whose
tour plans are disturbed, because special damages are
provable in a greater amount than provided by the
regulations .236

A federal district court recently found the breach of
contract claim viable in a non-tour-package situation in
Lopez v. Eastern Airlines.237 Eastern bumped Lopez from a
flight from Newark to Miami en route to a wedding. Lopez declined to accept denied boarding compensation, ultimately using his ticket on a late flight which arrived
between 3:00 and 4:00 in the morning instead of the originally scheduled time of midnight. 23 8 The court recog-

nized that the widespread disclosure of overbooking
practices foreclosed the common-law fraudulent misrepresentation claim set forth in Nader. However, the court
reasoned that simply because one common-law claim was
not available, "it does not follow that [bumped] passengers should not be able to seek relief from such a vexing
practice under a breach of contract theory.

' 23 9

Specifi-

cally following Goranson, the court found Eastern Airlines
liable for common-law breach of contract and awarded
Lopez actual compensatory damages. 240

These damages

included out-of-pocket costs and amounts for inconvenience, loss of time, anxiety, and frustration.24 '
Although reported cases allowing recovery for bumping
on a breach of contract are few, one may expect that the
theory will be used more with corresponding decline in
Id. at 68, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 775.
677 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
"-:,I
Id. at 182. Lopez was an attorney who apparently understood the significance of accepting the compensation, because he was aware that Eastern
overbooked and was aware that his ticket contained provisions relating to
overbooking and available damages. Id.
2.31 Id. at 183.
2:17

241

Id.

Id. (citing Goranson, 121 Misc. 2d at 68, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 781 (damages for
extreme inconvenience) and Smith II, 567 F.2d at 292 (affirming damages for inconvenience)). The court awarded only $450, "not much, unless as one suspects,
Lopez has brought this action for the principle of it all." Id.
241

19891

COMMENTS

1171

misrepresentation and discrimination as causes of action.2 42 The regulations of 14 C.F.R. section 250 will govern the contractual relationship. The passenger will
probably be held to standards established by the regulations for compliance with airline rules for ticketing, checkin, and reconfirmation. According to the regulations, the
passenger must decline the denied boarding compensation and probably also decline any alternate travel arrangement which would reach his destination within one
hour of the original arrival time. If the passenger proves
compliance with the regulations, however, a court may require the airline to compensate the passenger for his actual damages, which may be more than the ticket price
and more than the amount specified in the regulations.
However, because damages under breach of contract theory are only compensatory in nature, plaintiffs will probably not recover the large punitive damage awards feared
by the airlines after Nader.
4.

Emotional Distress -

Mental Anguish

Intentional infliction of emotional distress as a common-law claim has greater potential for sizeable awards
than a contract claim. In Nader, the Supreme Court
clearly affirmed the passenger's right to pursue commonlaw claims under the regulations, 243 with no limitations on
any particular cause of action. In addition to common-law
misrepresentation and contract claims, then, the passenger has the right to pursue any common-law claim provable under the facts and circumstances, including
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Courts have
awarded small amounts for anxiety and inconvenience re-- Another recent decision has used breach of contract theory against an airline, but not in the bumping context. See Mathews v. Northwest Airlines, 3 Av. L.
Rep. (CCH) (21 Av. Cas.)
17,300 (Feb. 8, 1988) (holding that passenger could
collect refund on tickets purchased at a reduced rate with nonrefundable cancellation clause, because there was no mutuality of obligation as the airline could cancel her reservation at any time and bump her due to overbooking).
-, .Vader III, 426 U.S. at 300; see supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text for
preservation of common law claims.
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sulting from bumping.2 44 In practice, however, emotional
distress as a separate tort has not met with success.
In Reyes v. Eastern Airlines,2 45 Mrs. Reyes and her two
daughters were bumped from an Eastern flight from New
York City to San Juan, Puerto Rico at 10:30 p.m. They
finally boarded a flight at 8:00 a.m. the following morning, having spent the entire night in the airport with no
money, no accommodations, and little assistance from the
airline in dealing with the situation.246 Mrs. Reyes alleged
damages of $70,000 for mental anguish and pain from being left alone in the airport.24 7 The court examined the
facts carefully to determine whether there was any basis
for so great a recovery or whether the amount was alleged
as a means of meeting the requisite amount in controversy
for federal jurisdiction in a diversity case.2 48 The court
acknowledged that there might be a valid tort claim under
Puerto Rican law, but held that the plaintiff would not be
able to recover the amount claimed under Puerto Rican
requirements. 249 The court stated that the plaintiff could
recover damages if her emotional condition had been af-1 See supra notes 168-177 and accompanying text for discussion of Smith v.
Piedmont Aviation, 412 F. Supp. 641 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (award of compensatory
damages which included actual damages for car rental and damages for emotional
distress was affirmed by the court of appeals), afd in part and rev'd in part, 567 F.2d
290 (5th Cir. 1978) ;see also supra notes 237-241 and accompanying text for discussion of Lopez v. Eastern Airlines, 677 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (awarding
$450 for inconvenience, loss of time, anxiety, and frustration).
-" 528 F. Supp. 765 (D.P.R. 1981).
2
Id. To compound the situation, the Reyes' spoke very little English. Id.
..
47 Id. Reyes requested another $5,000 in damages for hardship, and mental
anguish and pain as a result of loss of her baggage and later receipt of a letter
from Eastern Airline's claims department refusing liability. Id. Reyes' husband,
as co-plaintiff, alleged another $40,000 in damages for mental anguish and pain
because he could not find his wife and daughters at the airport when he went to
meet the flight. Id.at 767.
2'. Id.
2411 Id. The court acknowledged that judgment for pain and suffering was "necessarily subjective and must rest upon an evaluation of the severity of pain suffered, its duration and its mental consequences." Id. The court also noted the
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico required that moral damages be compensated only
if "it is shown how those damages affected the health, welfare, and happiness of
the injured." Id. at 767-68 (citing Ramos Rivera v. E.L.A., 90 P.R.R. 806 (1964)).
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fected substantially, 250 but the court failed to find physical
injury, medical treatment, hospitalization, expenses, disbursement, loss of incomes, or other special damages to
support a claim of emotional distress. 2 ' Based on the
paucity of proof, the court rejected the plaintiffs claim as
made in bad faith for the purpose of obtaining federal jurisdiction.252 Thus the court approved the availability of
the emotional distress claim under state law, but not its
manipulation for federal jurisdictional purposes.
Even where a plaintiff can prove medical expenses, general tort law may disallow such expenses where there is a
superseding or intervening cause. In Farmilantv. Singapore
2 54
Airlines,2 53 a plaintiff with an "open" ticket in the Orient
was bumped from a flight to Madras, but no alternative
flight seats were available for the next three weeks. His
alternate travel arrangements included a train trip during
which he apparently suffered food poisoning. Once back
in the United States, he spent twelve days in the hospital
recovering from his illness.255 The court held that the
train meal was a superseding cause of his illness that was
not attributable to the airline, and reduced the possible
award to compensatory damages only.2 5 6 In addition, the
court disallowed punitive damages because Farmilant
failed to show wilfulness, malice, or fraud on the part of
25.

Id. at 767.

Id. (citing Gill v. Allstate Ins. Co., 458 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1972)).
Id. at 768. The court noted the Christensen II decision in which the court
found that the plaintiff prayed for a large amount of damages in bad faith for
jurisdictional purposes. Id.; see supra notes 137-143 and accompanying text for
further discussion of Christensen I.
2r...561 F. Supp. 1148 (N.D. I11.1983).
1,,"Id. at 1149. The "open" arrangement included a round trip ticket between
Los Angeles and Singapore, with short regional flights left open for his own travel
flexibility. The travel agent assured him there was "no problem" with booking
passage whenever he wanted, but the lack of a confirmed reservation obviously
created problems in pursuing a bumping claim. Id. at 1149-50.
251

252

255

Id. at 1150.

Id. at 1151. Farmilant alleged misrepresentation, breach of contract, negligence, and wilful and wanton conduct by the airline. After excluding the medical
expenses, the court concluded that compensatory damages could include extra
living costs, extra costs for travel by rail, and extra costs for the use of another
carrier for the flight home. Id.
2:1
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the airline agent who told him there would be "no problem" travelling around the Orient without confirmed reservations once he arrived in the region.25 7 Because of the
court's holdings, damages fell short of the jurisdictional
amount, allowing the court to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 258 The court indicated in dicta that
the airline might have been negligent in its treatment of
Farmilant, but not intentionally evil or malicious. 259 Thus
one could infer that Farmilant might have been more successful in state court with a state law claim of negligence
by the airline or intentional
infliction of emotional dis26 0
agent.
the
by
tress
Courts disposed of two very recent cases in which plaintiffs alleged infliction of emotional distress on the
grounds that the plaintiff had failed to raise a triable issue
of fact. In Marshall v. Pan American World Airways,2 6 ' the
airline bumped Marshall and her three children from a
flight to St. Croix. She accepted alternate travel arrangements but the airline bumped her a second time the next
day.2 6 2 Following an altercation with Pan Am's ticket
agent, Marshall sued for assault, false imprisonment, negligent hiring and employment of the ticket agent, and
negligent infliction of emotional distress.263 The emo
tional distress claim included both an intentional infliction element based on the agent's behavior toward the
plaintiff and a negligent infliction element based on airline supervision of employees and regulation of its business. 2 64 The court found that Marshall failed to submit
257 Id. The court stated that "mere negligence is not enough" to sustain punitive damages. Id.
Ild. at 1152.
25;

Id.

Id. The judge pointedly told Farmilant, "Don't try to make a federal case
out of it." Id.
26. 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (21 Av. Cas.)
17,407 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 8, 1988).
26" Id. at 17,408.
I,;:,
Id.
Id. The plaintiff alleged that the airline negligently inflicted emotional distress "by failing to enact rules and regulations in respect to the operation of the
26..

...passenger

terminal; in failing to supervise the employees at the ...terminal; in
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enough evidence on the negligent hiring and negligent in265
fliction of emotional distress to raise a factual question,
and granted summary judgment for the airline. The court
denied summary judgment on the false imprisonment and
assault claims, however, impliedly preserving the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim associated
with them. 266 Although the final disposition of the case is
not available, it seems clear that the claim can be valid
under state law if properly grounded in the facts and
circumstances.
In Braunstein v. United Airlines,2 6 7 a passenger alleged
emotional distress as a result of being bumped. Braunstein claimed that the airline bumped her involuntarily after a pushing and shoving incident among passengers
waiting in line for boarding passes.2 6 8 She accepted alternate travel arrangements, but arrived at her destination at
3:00 a.m., at an airport different from the airport scheduled by her original ticket.269 She claimed damages for
meals, numerous telephone calls, and "extreme anxiety
and emotional upset" in the amount of $25,000.270 The
airline proved, however, that the flight was not
overbooked 27 1 though neither side fully explained why
failing to enact rules and regulations to permit passengers to board airplanes, and
in otherwise acting in a reckless, careless, and negligent manner." Id.
'- Id. at 17,408-09.
261; Id. at 17,408.
The court allowed the assault and false imprisonment claims
to go forward against the airline since the court found the question of whether the
agent's activities were within the scope of his employment to be one of fact for the
jury. The airline maintained that the plaintiff was screaming and interfering with
the boarding of the flight, so the court could not say as a matter of law that the
alleged tortious acts of the agent in resistance were not within the scope of his
employment. Id.
267

684 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).

Id. at 388. The facts in the reported decision are sparse about the events
leading to the bumping accident. Braunstein alleged that a "screaming commotion" took place and that she was bumped in the ensuing confusion. Id.
Id. Braunstein was scheduled to arrive at LaGuardia Airport originally, but
arrived on the alternate flight at Newark Airport much later than her originally
scheduled arrival time. The airline countered that she had failed to change planes
in Denver, thus arriving at the wrong airport. Id. at 389.
6'1

Id. at 388.

'-71,

..
7, Id. The plane left with 189 empty seats after a one hour delay due to operational difficulties. Id.
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Braunstein failed to board the flight. The court found no
facts to support Braunstein's claim that the airline denied
her boarding by its acts or omissions, and granted summary judgment for the airline.272 The court largely ignored the emotional distress claim, concentrating instead
on the contract aspects of the case.273 This state court
found no merit in an emotional distress claim standing
alone without a corresponding contract claim, even
though Braunstein had not alleged breach of contract
against the airline.274
Thus, a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress may be a valid common-law cause of action in the
bumping situation, but as a practical matter, recovery is
very difficult to achieve. Courts apply established tort
principles of state law to the facts in an exacting manner.
The emotional injury must be substantial, and there
should be provable expenses from that injury, such as
medical expenses, loss of earnings, or other special damages. An intervening or superseding cause destroys the
claim, as in any tort. One possible advantage of an emotional distress claim is that it might apply to the behavior
of the individual agent during the bumping incident instead of overall airline policies on overbooking. It is
clear, however, that courts will not entertain frivolous
claims for emotional distress, nor will they allow large unsubstantiated claims of damages to go forward just to satisfy the amount in controversy for federal jurisdiction.
5.

Other Issues Related to Bumping
There are other claims related to bumping which warrant only brief mention here, primarily because plaintiffs
have not sustained recoveries by using them. For instance, a third party cause of action for bumping is sel._72Id. at 389.
27:, Id. The court cited Lopez, 677 F. Supp. at 181, supra note 237, and Goranson
v. Trans World Airlines, 121 Misc. 2d 68, 467 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Civ. Ct. 1983), supra
note 222, which allowed recoveries based on contract claims. Braunstein, 684 F.
Supp. at 389.
"'7 Braunstein, 684 F. Supp. at 389.
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dom successful although various parties have sued on
behalf of or as co-plaintiffs with a bumped passenger.
The Nader court of appeals denied a third party cause of
action to the group whose rally Nader missed, even
though it lost money when Nader failed to appear.275
Thus, courts can be expected to limit consequential damages for missed engagements, meetings, and other appointments to damages suffered by the passenger himself
with no recourse for the affected third party.
In one instance, a court denied a travel agency standing
to sue on behalf of its customers who had been
bumped.2 7 6 The passengers assigned their claims to the
agency, but the court ruled that the assignment of a tortious cause of action was invalid under state law and rejected the third party claim. In other cases, courts found
that tour operators lacked standing to bring a discrimination claim under section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 on behalf of their bumped clients.2 77 The
tour operators fell outside the class of persons the statute
was designed to protect, thus limiting the claim to the individual actually bumped. Although it might seem more
efficient and more effective for a travel agent to sue on
behalf of his clients if a number of them are bumped from
a certain flight, the courts deny standing on both common-law and statutory claims.
Even close relatives of bumped passengers lack third
party standing to recover damages. Parents who
purchased a ticket for a minor daughter could not sue on
.7,Nader H, 512 F.2d at 549; see supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text for
discussion of the Vader II court of appeals decision.
276 Sabon Invs. v. Braniff Airways, 534
F. Supp. 683 (D. Ariz. 1982) (travel
agency lacked standing to bring tortious cause of action against airline on behalf
of customers).
_77Great Destinations, Inc. v. Transportes Aereos Portugueses S.A.R.L., 460 F.
Supp. 1160 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (tour operator lacked standing to assert discrimination claim under section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 because tour
operator did not intend to take passage on the carrier's airplanes). For an analysis
of the standing issue for a discrimination claim based on section 404(b), see Sanders v. Air India, 454 F. Supp. 1371 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The Sanders reasoning was
adopted by the Great Destinations court. Great Destinations, 460 F. Supp. at 1164.
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a contract claim, because the daughter accepted the denied boarding compensation and signed a release of liability for the airline.278 The parents also lacked standing
to sue for fraudulent misrepresentation because they were
too remote from the transaction for the airline to owe
them a duty of disclosure.279
A wife could not recover on a discrimination claim
based on section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 when her husband was denied transportation, 280 because derivative claims for emotional distress were not actionable under the statute.2 8' This court did remand the
wife's claim of emotional distress for evaluation under
common-law tort principles, leaving open the possibility
that a wife might recover damages for emotional
distress
282
when the husband was denied boarding.
In addition, there is probably not a cause of action for
bumping under the Warsaw Convention,2 83 although
courts differ in their opinions as to its availability. One
federal district court allowed a claim for bumping on an
international flight under the Convention,284 but recently
a court of appeals criticized the opinion and held that the
Warsaw Convention did not create a cause of action for
bumping. 285 According to its view, the remedy for bumping comes from the law of the injured party's home coun27. Roman v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1160 (N.D. IIl. 1977) (parents
were in a position too remote to be able to recover from airline for misrepresentations made in connection with daughter's flight).
U79 Id. at 1168. The daughter also signed a release which "as a matter of law
bar[red] any claim her parents [might] have .... " Id. at 1166.
21 Mason v. Belieu, 542 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
2-" Id. at 220.
2K2 Id. at 222. The court of appeals noted that the trial court appeared to assess
damages "both for Pan American's refusal to let Mr. Mason board and for its
failure to explain his absence to Mrs. Mason when she inquired at the Pan Am
desk." Id. at 220.

.3

See supra note 198.

Harpalani v. Air India, 622 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. IIl. 1985) (holding that Article
19 of the Warsaw Convention established a cause of action for bumping on an
international flight, and that other state and federal claims were preempted by the
Convention).
2-., Wolgel v. Mexicana Airlines, 821 F.2d 442, 445 (7th Cir. 1987) (criticizing
the Harpalani holding, and finding that the Warsaw Convention did not apply to
21,
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try.2 8 6 The Convention applies only to delay and not to

total nonperformance of the carriage contract.287 Other
district court decisions have denied recovery under the
Convention for bumping, leaving little positive authority
for any bumping claim under the international treaty.288
Finally, there are instances of denied boarding due to
reasons other than overbooking of the flight. The airlines
have great discretion when the denial of boarding is for
safety or health reasons as opposed to the usual oversales
situation. A court upheld an airline's right to deny boarding to a passenger who, in its judgment, is too ill or infirm
to travel unaccompanied. 289 The court emphasized, however, that such judgment does not allow airlines to unjustly discriminate against sick, elderly, or handicapped
persons. 290 Also, an airline may for safety reasons deny
boarding to an individual whom they believe to be armed
or dangerous. An airline which acted properly and reasonably in refusing to board a passenger who was the subject of a FBI report was not liable for discrimination,
breach of contract, or false imprisonment. 29 However,
carriers may not deny boarding unreasonably without
292
some investigation of a complaint against a passenger.
bumping); see supra notes 196-208 and accompanying text for discussion of the
WVolgel case under section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.
2...

Jolgel, 821 F.2d at 444.

Id. The court looked to the history of the Warsaw Convention to determine
that the drafters did not intend the word "delay" to extend to claims arising from
total non-performance. Id.
2..
See also Hill v. United Airlines, 550 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Kan. 1982) (holding
that a cause of action for delay of flight due to misrepresentation was outside the
Warsaw Convention); Mahany v. Air France, 474 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(holding damages occasioned by delay only to be actionable under Warsaw Convention, and two-year statute of limitations of Warsaw Convention does not apply
to claim under section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958).
Adamsons v. American Airlines, 58 N.Y.2d 42, 444 N.E.2d 21, 22, 457
N.Y.S.2d 771 (1982) (holding airline may refuse passage to individual where in its
judgment a sick or invalid person will require extraordinary individual care so as
to interfere with the airline's duty to other passengers).
Id. at 50, 444 N.E.2d at 26, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 776.
Williams v. Trans World Airlines, 509 F.2d 942, 943 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding
that airline receiving information that passenger was dangerous could refuse carriage to the passenger).
292 Cordero v. Cia Mexicana de Aviacion, 681 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1982) (airline
'17
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Nor can an airline use the
safety issue as a sham to insu293
late itself from liability.
Thus, before bringing a claim for bumping, a practitioner should evaluate the facts and circumstances to determine the reason for denied boarding. If the airline's
overbooking of the flight led to the need to bump some
passengers, then the causes of action outlined by this paper could apply. If the airline denied carriage for health
or safety reasons, the claims related to overbooking may
not apply. However, the passenger can question the airline's justification and procedure in denying boarding.
CONCLUSION

Deregulation has not significantly changed overbooking
practices. The legislature maintained the oversales regulation in 14 C.F.R. section 250 by transferring its administration to the Department of Transportation, impliedly
accepting the practice of overbooking itself.294 The only
major change relating to bumping has been the repeal of
the antidiscrimination provision of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958,295 depriving plaintiffs of a major statutory
cause of action. Airlines continue to overbook for financial reasons, and bumping may occur more frequently
2 96
now than in the past.
Indeed, overbooking is arguably one rational method of
protecting the airlines against "no-shows" and last minute
cancellations. An alternative method would be to enforce
contract provisions on both sides of the carrier-passenger
relationship: carriers could not bump, and passengers
could not unreasonably deny passage to individual involved in altercation in airplane without some inquiry into complaints against him).
-,wlSherrod v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 46 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) (passenger wrongfully ejected from airplane for having open can of beer suffered unjust discrimination, humiliation, and indignity for which the airline was liable in
compensatory damages).
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text for statistical summary indicating recent increases in bumping incidents.
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could not cancel. Airlines would have seats paid for
whether passengers flew or not. However, this solution is
not desirable from either the passenger's or the airline's
position. Such a solution would deprive passengers of
their freedom to change plans without financial loss, and
airlines would have wasted space that another passenger
could use. Thus strict enforcement of the contractual relationship might have undesirable economic results. Still
another solution might be to allow passengers who do not
want the airline to deny their boarding to pay a premium
to guarantee their reservation. Regular or lower priced
tickets would be subject to the usual risk of bumping.
Last, changing the booking system in response to consumer demand might alleviate the problem in part.
If regulatory agencies or consumer demands do not
curtail overbooking, however, the system of grievance and
redress is likely to operate in the future much like it has in
the past. Since deregulation maintained the regulations in
14 C.F.R. section 250, passengers still have the choice of
accepting compensation as specified in the regulations or
seeking redress in court.29 7 Because the regulations have
responded to a certain extent to the plight of consumers
and to certain court decisions, particularly Nader,2 9 8 they
now define more precisely the passenger's rights and the
airline's obligations. Under current regulations airlines
protect themselves from misrepresentation claims by giving public notice of overbooking 299 and from discrimination claims by
formulating
and
adhering
to
nondiscriminatory boarding priority rules .300 By asking
for volunteers to give up seats, airlines allow willing passengers to delay flight, and thus accommodate passengers
who might suffer extreme inconvenience from bumping.
2,17

See 14 C.F.R. § 250.8(b) (1988).

2-'.

See supra notes 67-112 and accompanying text for discussion of the Nader

case.
2....

14 C.F.R. §§ 250.11(a), (b) (1988).

See supra notes 167-232 and accompanying text for discussion of the discrimination claim. Cf 14 C.F.R. § 250.3 (1988), supra note 123, for antidiscrimination
provision in current regulations.
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Passengers, on the other hand, receive the equivalent of
contract damages through denied boarding compensation. The bumped passenger quickly receives alternate
travel arrangements and the cost of his ticket.3 0
If the passenger declines compensation under the regulation, he may turn to the legal system for a remedy.
However, the legal system declines to regulate the airlines, in deference to the legislature and administrative
agencies. 302 Courts will probably continue to apply common-law principles to redress individual grievances over a
particular bumping incident. In the future, plaintiffs can
probably use the state law claims reviewed by this paper
with some success. In addition, courts may extend the repealed statutory cause of action for discrimination to one
arising under the regulatory language. Plaintiffs can use
still another claim which does not appear in the reported
cases. The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 48 acknowledges a common carrier's special liability for insults
by the carrier's servants while acting in the scope of their
employment.30 3 If the airline agent's conduct in bumping
the passenger is offensive, a plaintiff might use this section in addition to a claim for the infliction of emotional
distress.
As a review of the cases shows, however, bumped plaintiffs typically do not receive large damage awards, if they
receive awards at all. Many potential plaintiffs may decide
damages do not offset costs of litigation, particularly attorney's fees. Delay in the litigation process and uncertainty of outcome may further discourage bumped
passengers from seeking redress in court. Many bumped
passengers, however disgruntled, may take denied boarding compensation rather than court action as the most ex:-, 14 C.F.R. §§ 250.4, 250.5 (1988).
.... See supra notes 153-154 and accompanying text for one court's explicit refusal to regulate disclosure, deferring to CAB or the legislature.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 48 (1965). This section states: "A common carrier or other public utility is subject to liability to patrons utilizing its
facilities for gross insults which reasonably offend them, inflicted by the utility's
servants while otherwise acting within the scope of their employment." Id.
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pedient remedy. In the future, courts could tip the scales
toward the bumped consumer by sustaining larger
awards, either for tort claims or by finding a malicious element in the practice of overbooking sufficient to sustain a
punitive award.
Consumers can hope to change overbooking practices
and bumping only through market demand for guaranteed seats or through changes in public perceptions of the
problem. Changing public perceptions could lead to legislative or administrative curtailment of overbooking itself
or to justification of larger awards by courts. Without
some significant fundamental change in those perceptions, however, airlines may be expected to continue
overbooking and the legal system will provide remedies
on a case-by-case basis. Ultimately, deregulation may
have little practical impact on the problems of overbooking and bumping in general.
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